This work aims to develop an automatic tool that can perform the laborious and error-prone reverse engineering task of binary authorship characterization, i.e., determining clues related to the author(s) of a piece of binary code. Software code written by human programmers reects the author's educational background, level of expertise, and coding traits. Accordingly, these may be characterized by identifying meaningful features and examining them. Binary authorship characterization reveals information that can be extremely useful for security applications such as digital forensics, malware triage, and binary vulnerability tracking. This paper proposes a system, BinChar, that capture various aspects of author style, including code trait characteristics, code structure characteristics, and code behavior characteristics.
Introduction
When analyzing malware binaries, reverse engineers often pay special attention to their characterization for several reasons. First, reports from anti-malware companies indicate that nding the similarities between malware code characteristics can aid in developing proles for malware families [1] . Second, recently released reports by Citizen team [2, 3] show that malware binaries written by authors having the same origin share similar characteristics.
Third, many malware packages could have been written only by authors with a special level of expertise and special knowledge for dealing with specic resources; an example is SCADA system malware. This insight provides a critical clue for the extraction of information about the functionality of a malware binary. Fourth, although obfuscation techniques may be applied before the malware is released and may modify the code signicantly, it is still desirable to determine which obfuscation techniques and tools have been used. Last, clustering binary functions based on a common origin may help reverse engineers identify the group of functions that belong to a particular malware family or decompose the binary based on the origin of its functions.
The ability to conduct these analyses at the binary level is especially important for security applications because the source code for malware is not always available. However, in automating binary authorship characterization, two main challenges are typically encountered: the binary code lacks many abstractions (i.e., function prototypes) that are present in the source code; and the time and space complexities of analyzing binary code are greater than those of the corresponding source code. Although signicant eorts have been designed to develop automated systems for source code authorship characterization [4, 5, 6, 7] , these often depend on features that will likely not be preserved in the strings of bytes representing executable le after the compilation process, such as variable and function naming, original control and data ow structures, comments, and space layout.
To the best of our knowledge, there have been no attempts to characterize the authors of program binaries.
Nonetheless, a few approaches to binary authorship attribution have been proposed, but they typically use machine learning algorithms to extract unique patterns for each author and then compare a given target binary against such patterns to identify the author [8, 9, 10, 11, 12] .
These approaches cannot be applied directly to binary authorship characterization because of the following limitations: the chosen features are generally not related to author style but rather to functionality; they are not applicable to real malware; and dealing with the binary au-BlackHat conference [2] . It was concluded that a set of features can be employed to group malware binaries according to authorship characterizations. However, the process is not automated and requires considerable human intervention.
System overview. To address the aforementioned limitations, this paper presents an innovative system, BinChar, that describes the characteristics of programmers according to their educational background, level of expertise, and coding traits. To achieve this, we have dened a new set of features that extracts authorship attribution characteristics. These features are extracted from dierent levels: the level of the basic blocks, the level of the function bodies, the program level, and the le level. Based on them, our system is able to detect structural, optimization, knowledge, expertise, and code trait characteristics, and also overall characteristics that is resulted from the aforementioned characteristics together. All the extracted features are passed to the CNN. We observe note some attractive characteristics of neural networks such as they can learn end-to-end, where each stage is trained simultaneously to achieve the end goal [13] . Also, the nodes of CNN can act as lters over the input space and can discover the strong correlation in the binary code [14] . Third, CNN is considered a fast neural network in classication process when it is compared with other neural networks such as recurrent neural network [15] . The results obtained from CNN is passed to Bayesian calibration to precisely check the correctness of CNN.
Contributions. Our contributions are summarized below.
• We designed a new set of features that make BinChar accurate and ecient, enabling it to characterize the authors of program binaries with high speed while tolerating the noise injected by code transformations arising from the use of dierent compilers and optimization speed levels. The experimental results show that our system is able to cluster the samples according to similarities in authorship characteristics with a precision of over 95%.
• We investigated the eectiveness and the power of CNNs in the context of binary authorship characterization. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst work in which CNNs are used for binary authorship characterization. Further improvement is achieved by performing Bayesian calibration, which reduces the rate of false positives to 0.02%.
• We used BinChar to extract author characteristics from Mirai botnet binaries and compared the results with those for 360,000 malware samples collected from various sources. Finally, we report the authorship characteristics common to the Mirai botnet and other families.
Preliminaries

Threat Model
BinChar is designed to assist, instead of replacing, reverse engineers in various use cases of characterizing the author of program binaries, such as forensic analysis (e.g., linking a new malware to previously known malware or malware author(s), clustering a group of malware based on common characteristics, and nding co-authorship for the malware binary code (e.g., to determine "inuencers" in the code community), and software copyright infringement analysis (e.g., detecting borrowed code fragments inside a program binary based on authorship characteristics). Therefore, the focus of BinChar is not on general reverse engineering tasks, such as unpacking and deobfuscating malware samples (although BinChar leverages some existing tools to de-obfuscate and unpacked such binaries), but rather on detecting and determine authorship characteristics clues such as using advanced resources, particular compiler, os, specic code traits, memory allocation habits, c&c commands, etc. We just pay attention to the author characteristics which can be common among different set of authors). Moreover, the authors of a specic malware family, they have to share common knowledge and expertise to deal with a particular environment [16, 17] .
In designing the features and methodology of BinChar, we have taken into consideration some potential countermeasures. In particular, BinChar assumes the adversary may attempt to evade detection through the following.
• The adversaries may apply refactoring techniques, e.g., when a malware author aims to defeat forensic analysis by modifying his/her own code, or when an adversary attempts to modify borrowed code written by other authors in order to evade copyright infringement detection.
• The adversaries may apply obfuscation techniques on binary les to alter its syntax, e.g., when a malware author wants to defeat anti-virus signature-based detection.
• Since a program can be signicantly altered by simply changing the compilers or their settings, the adversary may make such changes to evade detection.
We will show in later sections how BinChar may survive the aforementioned threats. Simply, the features of BinChar have been designed to determine binary authorship characteristics at multiple abstraction levels, which makes it harder for adversaries to evade system detection [2] . In addition, an operational solution is to customize and enrich the list of features employed by BinChar based on the actual use case and learning data, which will not only make it much more dicult for adversaries to hide all of their binary code characteristics such as code traits, but will also improve accuracy. it is not our intention to identify the author, but rather to characterize the author. Finally, it may be suspected that a piece of code is not written by the claimed author, but yet there are no leads as to who the actual author may be [4] . For this reason, we may compare the programs written by the claimed author and measure the degree of similarity in terms of binary code characteristics.
Forensic Investigation. FireEye [18] discovered that malware binaries share the same digital infrastructure and code (for instance, the use of certicates, executable resources and development tools). FireEye investigators eventually noticed that malware binaries of the same previouslydiscovered infrastructures are written by the same group of authors. In such cases, training on such binaries and some random authors' code may oer vital assistance to forensic investigators. In addition, testing recent pieces of malware binary code using condence metrics would verify if a specic author is the actual author.
System Overview
The architecture of BinChar is illustrated in Figure 1 .
As shown, the four main components are: (i) Preprocessing component where PEle [19] is employed to check if the binary le is packed. If it is packed, the corresponding unpacker, such as UPX, is used to unpack the binary le and pass the unpacked binary le to the disassembler tools such as IDA Pro [20] . 
BinChar: Design Overview
In this section, we describe our system in detail.
Feature Engineering 3.1.1. Optimization Characteristics
We designed a set of features based on existing tools [22, 23, 24, 25] . We leveraged these tools to construct a data ow graph incorporating data and control dependencies.
The graph reveals the inline functions, making it easy to count them. Then we constructed a semantic graph and normalized it by applying the rules introduced in [23] 
Structural Characteristics
In this subsection, we merge the Annotated Control Flow Graph (ACFG) and the Data Flow Graph (DFG) into one graph, named author style graph. The intuition behind merging them is that the ACFG may reveal the characteristics of the author's task implementation, while the DFG reveals how the author manipulates variables and also highlights the author's use of small functions, which are typically inlined by the compiler during optimization.
Author Style Graph
We build a semantic control ow graph called the Annotated Control Flow Graph (ACFG). It is an abstracted version of the CFG, generalizing specic types of CFG features according to multiple criteria. The steps for constructing an ACFG are summarized as follows. The system takes a CFG as an input and computes the frequency of opcodes across instruction groups. Then, it categorizes assembly instructions into six groups [26] , as shown in Table 1.
The resulting ACFG describes structural characteristics. The next step is to complement it with the Data Flow Graph (DFG). Then, data ow dependencies can be incorporated to make it possible to use coarse reasoning about the program control ow and data dependencies to infer how the author manipulates program variables and how variable relations are built. Let R k /W k denote registers 
is a directed attributed graph, where N is a set of nodes, V ⊆ (N × N ) is a set of edges and ζ is an edge labeling function which assigns a label to each edge: ζ −→ γ, where γ is a set of labels. Finally, ϑ is a data dependency function which labels each node n N based on the data dependency rules function λ.
Expertise Characteristics
Typically the path in the CFG has been shown as a robust feature [27] . Further, to nd matched paths can be considered as an alignment problem where dynamic programming can be applied [27] . Longest path reects the author traits in implementing tasks or using nested loops. Thus, we choose the longest path. We use depth rst search to traverse the CFG, and then choose the path with the largest number of nodes. Once the longest path is constructed, we extract two categories of features: statistical features (cyclomatic complexity) and dynamic features (execution traces).
Cyclomatic complexity [28] computes the quantity of linear independent paths to represent the complexity of a code in the form of a graph metric. The complexity C of the longest path of CFG is as follows:C = E + N + 2P , where E is the edge quantity, N is node quantity, and P is the quantity of connected components in the longest path.
Overall Characteristics
We convert the binary le content to a set of bytes.
This set is transferred into a matrix. This two-dimensional matrix has xed width d. It has been show that CNN can be more accurate and ecient to train if they contain shorter connections between layers close to the input and those close to the output [33] .
Consequently, we have adopted their CNN algorithm for binary authorship characterization. Their algorithm follows a feed-forward fashion by connecting each layer to every other layer. Where the inputs used for each layer, are the feature-maps of all preceding layers. Besides, its own feature-maps are used as inputs into all subsequent layers [33] . This has one main advantage by alleviating the vanishing-gradient problem.
Consider a feature vector v 0 , which is transferred through a convolutional network. The network consists of L layers, each of which implements a non-linear transformation T l where l indexes the layer. H l can be rectied linear units (ReLU) [34, 35] . We denote the output of i th layer as v i .
Identity function. In the traditional CNN forward networks, the output of l i layer as input to (l + 1)
i , which gives rise to the following layer transition:
To bypass the non-linear transformation, a skip connection has been added with a transition layer, and form an identity function:
The advantage of such process is that the gradient ows directly through the identity function from later layers to the earlier layers.
Dense connectivity. The information ow between layers should be improved in order to enhance the accuracy and eciency. Therefore, we use the proposed algorithm by [33] . They introduce direct connections from any layer to all subsequent layers. Hence, the i th layer receives the feature-maps of all preceding layers, v 0 , · · · , v i−1 , as input:
refers to the concatenation of the feature-maps produced in layer 0, · · · , i − 1.
Activation function. For this purpose, we have employed rectied linear unit (ReLU) [35] . This unit is computed separately for each layer. Without this unit, the layer will be an ane function.
Pooling layer. One of the challenges is that when the feature-maps size is changed. Therefore, it is important component of convolutional networks is pooling layers that change the size of feature-maps.
To enable pooling in our network, we divide our network to dierent dense component followed the architecture in [33] . We illustrate the layers with their connectivity in Figure 2 . As shown in Figure 2 , the layers between blocks are called transition layers which do convolution and pooling. We follow in our model, the same settings are used by [33] . They use batch normalization layer and an 1x1 convolutional layer followed by a 2x2 average pooling layer [33] . Considering 0 ≤ c ≤ 1 be some score given by the CNN, which indicates the degree to which a CNN measures a binary how similar is to other author of program binaries, with 0 being completely not related to any author, and 1 being certainly related to that author. Our goal is to convert this number into a "calibration score, which will provide the user a measure of how likely that the author of target binary is accurately related to the authors of candidates. To achieve this, we dene the calibration score as the probability that the author of program binary will accurately related to the resulted candidates by CNN, P (R = x i |C = c), given the score c, and list of candidates R = x 1 , x 2 , · · · x i , x i+1 , · · · x k , where k is the threshold value that represents the number of candidates.
Convolution
By using Bayes' law we have:
where p is the pdfs, we suppose that pdfs for the list of candidates and target scores for CNN, p(C = c|R = u), where u is the set of all candidates except the target le,
To have the probabilities sum up to 1, we use the constraint that gives us the nal value of the calibration score in terms of pdfs and probability of target author with the list of candidates. We dene our problem by our CNN's expected pdf for target binary and list of candidates u.
To derive the pdfs, we have used the non-parametric approach, like kernel density estimator (KDE) [37] , where we approximation a value of pdf given C by taking a weighted 
Clustering Similar Functions
For the clustering process, , we use a standard clustering algorithm (k-means) [21] to group functions with similar author characteristics attributes (v n1 , . . . , v nz ) into k clusters S = S 1 , . . . , S k and (k ≤ |F P1 | + |F P2 |) to minimize the intra-cluster sum of squares. For more details, we refer the reader to [21] 
Evaluation
In this section, we present the evaluation results for the possible use cases described earlier in this paper. Sec- 
Implementation Environment
The described binary feature extractions are implemented using separate python scripts for modularity purposes, which altogether form our analytical system. For CNN setup, we rst use a convolution with 16 output channels is performed on the input feature vectors before the rst dense block. We use kernal size 3x3 for convolutional layers. We follow zero-padded for inputs to keep the feature-map size xed [33] . We use 3x3 convolution followed by 4x4 average pooling as transition layers between two contiguous dense blocks. Further, the global average pooling is excuted at the end of the last dense block. Then a softmax classier is attached. The feature-map sizes in the two dense blocks are 128x128, and 64x64, respectively.
Dataset
The used dataset is consisted of several les from dierent sources, as described below: i) GitHub [38] ; ii) Google Code Jam [39] ; and iii) a set of known malware les representing a mixture of 1500 dierent families including the nine families provided in Microsoft Malware Classication Challenge [2] . Statistics about the dataset are provided in 
Accuracy
The purpose of this experiment is to evaluate the accuracy of characterizing the author of in program binaries.
Evaluation Settings. The methodology used in our evaluation uses both standard ten-fold cross-validation and random subset testing, based on the experiment: For classication of the entire data set, we use ten-fold crossvalidation.
The evaluation of BinChar system is conducted using the datasets described in Section 5.2. The data is randomly split into 10 sets, where one set is reserved as a testing set, and the remaining sets are used as training sets. The process is then repeated 15 times. To evaluate BinChar and to compare it with existing methods, precision P and recall R measures are applied. Furthermore, since the application domain targeted by BinChar is much more sensitive to false positives than false negatives, we employ an F-measure as follows:
BinChar Accuracy. We rst investigate the accuracy of our proposed system in identifying the author of program binaries based on author characteristics. The results are reported in Table 3 . The highest accuracy obtained by our tool is 0.94 when all characteristics components are together. Further, we can observe that the expertise characteristics return the highes accuracy of 0.93. This is due to the fact that the author may use his expertise to implement a specic task. For instance, the author may use specic package or advance resources to reduce the execution time. As mentioned earlier, we use static and dynamic feature to detect the author expertise characteristics. However, the optimization characteristics return an accuracy of 0.81. Here, we optimize the original code and then we compare them in terms of statistical analysis. We observe through our experiments if the author tries to optimize the written code, then these characteristics may not help fully to identify the characteristics of the author. 
False Positive Rate
We investigate the false positives in order to understand the situations where BinChar is likely to make incorrect attribution decisions. The average of false positive rate is 0.02%. It is very low and could be neglected. The reason behind the low false positive rate is that BinChar uses stratied detections system. We have observed that the false positives rate for google dataset is the highest rate and we believe the reason behind this is that each programmer should follow the standard coding instructions which restrict him/her to have their own code traits. [2] , whose goal is to predict classes of malware families. Due to the nature of malware, the identities of their authors are unknown. Attacker operations are known to be hard to attribute and rarely adjudicated, even if strong evidence can be found [2, 1] . This presents a major challenge to establishing a fully trustworthy ground truth.
With this in mind, BinChar considers each family as an author or set of authors who has similar characteristics.
The statistics are described in Table 4 . We label functions by using existing tools: IDA pro and Paradyn for labeling library-related functions. While we use BinComp [26] tool for labeling compiler-related functions. These samples contain dierent variants of the same malware so we assume that these variants are have similar authorship characteristics written by the same set of authors. The number of compiler functions are obtained based on BinComp tool [26] , while the fth column shows the number of library functions acquired by F.L.I.R.T technology [20] and Paradyn. According to Cluster Quality. One of the most challenging task is to assess the quality of the results that are produced by a clustering algorithm [40] . To tackle such challenge, we can quantify the number of clusters, the average number of samples per cluster, the relative sum of all pairwise distances for a cluster, or we choose a few clusters and manually verify that the samples in these clusters are similar.
Since we have access to the used samples. We manually verify the correctness of our clusters.
The Correctness of Clusters. To assess the quality of our cluster algorithm results, we introduce two metrics, We then apply our tool to cluster functions according to their similar authorship characteristics by using standard k-mean as we described earlier. Then we manually analysis the obtained clusters to classify them to correct/wrong clusters as shown in Table 5 . Through our analysis for the obtained clusters, we have found dierent set of characteristics including the usage of variables, the usage of security rules, the way of conguration, memory allocation habits, etc.
Characterizing the Mirai Botnet
One challenge in applying BinChar to real world malware is the lack of ground truth concerning the attribution of authorship due to the nature of malware. Also, whether a malware package is created by an individual or an organization is generally unconrmed. Those limitations partially explain the fact that few research eorts have been seen on this subject. We present in this section a case study by applying BinChar to Mirai botent and compare the extracted characteristics with 360,000 Internet which causes to shut down a major parts of Internet. It has been created using ELF binaries. The statistics of Mirai binaries is introduced in Table 7 . As shown in (Table 8) . For example, the number of features that are related to structure characteristics authors is 175 extracted from mirai.ppc. As shown, there are some features could not be extracted from les that are not x86-based architecture. We leave this issue for future work venue. We have studied the impact of each authorship characteristics on accuracy (Figure 3) Figure 3 : The F1 score between Mirai.x86 and the malware families in Table 6 Measuring the degree of similarity between ground truth datasets and malware binaries. As another verication of the correctness of the ndings, we measured the degree of similarity between the Mirai Botnet here and other datasets for which we have the ground truth (e.g., Google code jam) to see how likely such a degree of similarity could come from shared authorship characteristics.
The goal of computing the degree of similarity is to determine whether the authorship characteristics found in the Mirai botnet are present to the same degree in conventional binaries, which will reveal whether these characteristics are indeed specic to malware writers. To provide an even more convincing verication, we computed the similarity scores between related Mirai botnet samples and the rest of the available dataset. BinChar found a similarity of 7% with those characteristics in the Google code jam dataset and 17% with those characteristics in the Github dataset. We believe that one of the main reasons for the high similarity is that the programmers participating in the Github may have greater expertise, more extensive background knowledge, and better skills than the programmers who participate in Google code jam.
Measuring similarity between authorship characteristics in malware binaries. In this section, the goal is to assess the similarity between malware binaries by reporting the similarity in terms of authorship characteristics (Table 9 ). To conclude, we have presented the rst known eort on characterizing the author of binary code based on personnel characteristics. Previous existing works have only employed articial datasets, whereas we included more realistic datasets. We also applied our system to known malware. In summary, our system demonstrates superior results on more realistic datasets and real malware and can detect the presence of multiple authors.
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